“Examination of the voluminous legislative history of Title VI,” Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote in his controlling opinion in 1978 in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, “reveals a congressional intent to halt federal funding of entities that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution.”
Mr. Mitchell wrote that Justice Powell’s consideration of legislative history was both illegitimate and incomplete, as “there are plenty of floor statements from legislators who insisted that Title VI indeed require colorblindness, in accordance with the unambiguous statutory text.”
In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the court upheld the race-conscious admissions program at the University of Michigan’s law school on constitutional grounds and added, in a single sentence, that this meant a challenge under Title VI must also fail.
Taking account of legislative history to determine what a statute means has fallen out of favor at the Supreme Court, Professor Driver said.
“In modern legal circles, textualism is ascendant and legislative history has become close to verboten,” he said. “The brief offers the court an opportunity not only to wield textualism on behalf of a right-wing agenda but also to dunk on nontextualist justices from the 1970s. It well may prove to be an irresistible twofer.”
Mr. Mitchell filed his brief, on behalf of neither side, in the challenge to the admissions policies of Harvard, a private institution subject to Title VI. The University of North Carolina, a public institution, is subject to both Title VI and the equal protection clause.
Mr. Mitchell’s brief will not please all of his usual conservative allies, many of whom would prefer a sweeping and permanent constitutional ruling. But Mr. Mitchell urged the Supreme Court to avoid the constitutional issue, calling it “a much closer question, because it is far from clear that the text and original meaning of the equal protection clause preclude the use of remedial racial preferences.”